@ARTICLE{Wesoły2021:i6984,
	author="{Wesoły, Marian}",
	title="{Bycie – nie bycie, prawda – fałsz w koncepcji Arystotelesa}",
	year="2021",
	type="artykuł naukowy",
	language="pl",
	journal="{Peitho. Examina Antiqua}",
	issn="2082-7539",
	volume="12",
	number="1",
	pages="171--196",
	doi="10.14746/10.14746/pea.2021.1.9",
	url="https://pressto.amu.edu.pl/index.php/peitho/issue/view/1995",
	keywords="Aristotle, Being – Not-Being, Categorical predication, Falsity as Contra-diction, Truth as non-contradiction, Philosophy as investigation of truth, Truthfulness and Lying.",
	abstract="{The basis of Aristotle’s arguments about truth and falsity is formulated syntactically according to the distinctions of ‘to be’ as the predicative affirmation - composition and, correspondingly, ‘not to be’ as negation – separation. As the nominal defining characteristic of falsity is contradic-tion, so of truth is non-contradiction. The expression of truth or falsity in the declarative sentence of affirmation or negation is a function of thinking as a human cognitive disposition under the semantic figures of categorical predication. In addition, we cite Aristotle’s more important texts on the true intellection of non-composites (indivisibles), the inves-tigation of truth and probability, the diagnosis of falsehood, the truthful-ness and lying. Finally, a mention of modern adaptations of Aristotle’s concept of truth}",
}