Bycie – nie bycie, prawda – fałsz w koncepcji Arystotelesa
[ 1 ] Wydział Humanistyczny, Akademia im. Jakuba z Paradyża | [ P ] pracownik
EN Being – Not-Being, Truth – Falsehood in Aristotle’s View
2021
artykuł naukowy
polski
- Aristotle, Being – Not-Being, Categorical predication, Falsity as Contra-diction, Truth as non-contradiction, Philosophy as investigation of truth, Truthfulness and Lying.
EN The basis of Aristotle’s arguments about truth and falsity is formulated syntactically according to the distinctions of ‘to be’ as the predicative affirmation - composition and, correspondingly, ‘not to be’ as negation – separation. As the nominal defining characteristic of falsity is contradic-tion, so of truth is non-contradiction. The expression of truth or falsity in the declarative sentence of affirmation or negation is a function of thinking as a human cognitive disposition under the semantic figures of categorical predication. In addition, we cite Aristotle’s more important texts on the true intellection of non-composites (indivisibles), the inves-tigation of truth and probability, the diagnosis of falsehood, the truthful-ness and lying. Finally, a mention of modern adaptations of Aristotle’s concept of truth
2021
171 - 196
CC BY (uznanie autorstwa)
otwarte czasopismo
ostateczna wersja opublikowana
12.2021
w momencie opublikowania
70,0
70,0
